Date of Award

2016

Document Type

Dissertation/Thesis

Submission Date

October 2026

Thesis/Dissertation Advisor [Chair]

Tunick, Mark

Abstract

Theories addressing rights ascription and moral consideration have historically often focused on humans as the singular objects of moral agency. I examine the reasoning behind this focus to discover the degree to which non-human animals and artificial intelligence machines should be considered rational beings deserving of both moral consideration and legal personhood, on-par with a human. The disconnect between the moral consideration and rights ascription bestowed on profoundly-handicapped humans, anomalously-rational non-human animals, and AI machines of similar abilities is representative of anthropocentric speciesism and must be corrected if rational ability is the motivating force behind moral consideration and rights ascription. By removing the group affiliations or classifications of any being, we can create a more dynamic legal rights ascription system that only takes into account the abilities of the individual and their relevance within a given society. This new system serves to more accurately accommodate and represent anomalous beings of any species.

Comments

Includes bibliography.

Extent

64 p.

Identifier

FA00012602

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