Author Type

Graduate Student

Date of Award

2010

Document Type

Thesis

Publication Status

Version of Record

Submission Date

October 2026

Abstract

I investigate the association between independent directors' monitoring roles as distinguished by whether they reside on the audit committee (ACs) or not (NACs) and their respective ownership and whether Section 301 or a proxy for alternative independent monitoring (the percentage of institutional ownership) affects this relation. Specifically, I examine whether the objectivity required of serving as an AC (consistent with their audit function role) or alignment with investors (consistent with agency theory) dominates in determining independent directors' level of share ownership. Using generalized estimations of equations I provide evidence that ACs hold less ownership than NACs that suggests differences with respect to independence in appearance/ alignment with shareholder interests not previously documented amongst independent directors. I also find evidence that Section 301 may contribute to this differential ownership while the presence of institutional ownership moderates this relationship.

Extent

ix, 113 p. : ill.

Comments

by John Incardona.|Thesis (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2010.|Includes bibliography.|Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, Fla., 2010. Mode of access: World Wide Web.|by John Incardona.

Identifier

FADT2683129

Format

pdf

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