Author Type

Graduate Student

Date of Award

2009

Document Type

Thesis

Publication Status

Version of Record

Submission Date

October 2026

Abstract

Information leakage before full acquisitions has been widely documented. The information leakage, and the resulting pre-bid runup in the target's stock, generally increases the total cost of the acquisition. That is, information leakage and the ensuing pre-bid runup is a gain to the target and loss to the acquirer. Herein, I first ascertain the characteristics of full acquisitions that affect the amount of information leakage. I find that if the acquirer borrows to finance the acquisition then information leakage is greater. Further if the acquirer is foreign, if the target is a high-tech firm, and if the target has options on its stock all increase information leakage. I find hostile deals are effective in reducing information leakage. Lastly, information leakage increases in the percentage of managerial ownership. I next hypothesize that the identity and intent of partial acquirers is known to market participants before the announcement of a partial acquisition. I find that the market can anticipate whether a partial acquirer intends to fully-acquire or take an active role in the management of the target. Also, the market anticipates whether the acquirer is a private investment find or a non-financial corporation. Further, the acquirer's identity or intent is fully reflected in the target's stock price before the announcement of the partial acquisition. These results help explain why there are few partial acquisitions as precursors to full acquisitions.

Extent

xi, 205 p. : ill.

Comments

by Matthew David Brigida.|Thesis (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2009.|Includes bibliography.|Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, Fla., 2009. Mode of access: World Wide Web.|by Matthew David Brigida.

Identifier

FADT368613

Format

pdf

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