Author Type

Graduate Student

Date of Award

1990

Document Type

Thesis

Publication Status

Version of Record

Submission Date

October 2026

Thesis/Dissertation Advisor [Chair]

O'Sullivan, John

Abstract

In the years 1965 to 1968 of the Viet Nam War, high level U.S. military officials ordered arbitrary reductions of official estimates of the enemy order of battle. The motivation for their policy reflected the difficulties posed by this war. As divisiveness in the U.S. increased over support for the war, signs of progress in the war were in demand, but impressive military progress was not being made, although ARVN reports through 1966 reported military success. With bilateral intelligence, more accurate reports were made. The Johnson Administration called for dramatic progress reports. Among these, MACV's reports on enemy force estimates were useful to portray success. However, revised estimates showed increasing numbers, both in enemy force size and battalion and larger-scale enemy-initiated attacks. These reports were suppressed by destruction or modified through arbitrary cuts by military officials. Thus news on the war was falsified to the public.

Extent

140 p.

Comments

Dorothy F. Schmidt College of Arts and Letters|FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection|Thesis (M.A.)--Florida Atlantic University, 1990.|Dorothy F. Schmidt College of Arts and Letters

Identifier

FADT14680

Format

pdf

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